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Introduction 
 
It is time to set things right and start planning for growth once again. …above all, it means investing in 
an attractive public realm framework that will provide open space for old citizens and new, and that will 
lure better development…How does one pay for these improvements? The simple answer is that these 
are not expenditures but investments, and the dividend they yield comes in the form of increased tax 
revenue from developed property, which can pay the debt service on the bonds issued to cover the costs 
of these initial public investments…In Atlanta, my firm proposed just such a set of public realm 
improvements in the form of the Beltline Emerald Necklace, a 23-mile trail and light rail loop 
connecting over 2000 acres of new parkland. Thanks to the active support of Mayor Shirley Franklin, 
within one year the city approved the financing to implement the recommendations and has already 
acquired a property that will become the city's largest public park. The Beltline gained the widespread 
support of Atlantans because it offered growth with a high quality of life — growth that will make a 
better city. 
- Alexander Garvin (2006), chief designer of the Atlanta Beltline 
 
Our taxes have jumped….No building had happened there for years. Then this Beltline came out and all 
these speculative builders came in here. 
- Clarence Mackie, Atlanta resident who lives near the Beltline, quoted in McWhirter (2007) 
 
 
A number of observers have argued that, since the 1990s, many cities have experienced a 
type of “third-wave” gentrification that involves more government leadership than the second-
wave gentrification of the late 1970s and 1980s (Hackworth, 2007; Hackworth and Smith, 2001; 
Lees, Slater, and Wyly, 2007; Smith, 2002; Wyly and Hammel, 1999). In particular, many of 
these observers argue that, in this era of third-wave gentrification, local governments have 
become much more actively involved in promoting urban redevelopment in lower-income 
neighborhoods in part due to the fall of twentieth century American liberalism, or what some 
have called Keynesianism, recalling the federal interventionist policies of the New Deal and the 
Great Society programs (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). 
This paper examines the impacts on residential property values of municipal-led planning 
for a large-scale, multi-use land development project called the Atlanta Beltline, which involves 
the production, over a 25 year period, of a wide array of greenspace, light rail transit, and related 
privately-owned real estate developments. The paper considers the impacts on homes within the 
target development area as well as in nearby locations, with a particular emphasis on the portion 
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of the Beltline adjacent to substantial low-income populations. Unlike many analyses of state-led 
development initiatives, the analysis here focuses on impacts that occur as a result of the early 
planning for the ultimate project – and the public knowledge of such planning – rather than on 
impacts that follow formal state intervention or actual physical redevelopment. Given the long 
timelines involved in large-scale projects, and the possibility that land speculators and others 
may drive up land values well before the formal adoption of state subsidies or the breaking of 
ground on actual redevelopment projects, it is important to analyze price changes from the point 
of  initial public and investor awareness. 
In short, I find that residential property values for properties within one quarter mile of 
the proposed target development area appreciated at substantially higher rates than those of 
otherwise similar properties in the City of Atlanta. Moreover, the period of rapid appreciation 
matches quite well with the early, initial coverage of the planning process in local media. From 
2002 to the formal policy of tax increment financing was adopted in late 2005, values within a 
quarter mile of the Beltline area had appreciated as much as 30 percent or more than otherwise 
similar properties just a mile from the Beltline area, and this differential gain occurred over just a 
two to three year period. 
The Atlanta Beltline project involves the development of a 6,500 acre ring of parks, open 
space, light rail transit and mixed-use development by tying together infrastructure and related 
development along an existing 22-mile industrial rail line that circles the Atlanta central business 
district and the greater core of the city. The project will be funded in part by a tax increment 
financing (TIF) district expected to provide as much as $1.7 billion in funding.1 The Beltline is 
Atlanta’s sixth TIF, although it is far larger than any of the previous five TIFs, and is a major 
initiative in the Atlanta region. From 2003 through 2005, the major principal daily paper, the 
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Atlanta Journal Constitution ran more than 130 stories that mentioned the project, with more 
than 100 of these appearing in 2005 alone. 
Because of the scale and nature of the Beltline, as well as the large amount of press and 
public discussion that has focused on the project, the impacts of the project on nearby property 
values may be expected to far exceed those of the smaller, more targeted TIFs in Atlanta or 
elsewhere. Moreover, while some of the existing research on the effects of TIFs has focused on 
impacts on properties and activity within the TIFs after the TIF’s adoption or implementation, 
the focus here is primarily on the effect on residential property and residents near the Beltline 
TIF before development – or even the formal adoption of the TIF – occurs. The focus on 
spillover impacts on housing values is expected partly because the Beltline TIF area itself 
currently contains relatively few residential units, but more importantly, because the TIF may 
have substantial impacts on nearby neighborhoods.  
The primary empirical objective of this paper is to identify whether and to what extent 
the announcement of, and publicity around, the proposed Beltline TIF and associated 
redevelopment resulted in a bidding up of residential property values even before the TIF was 
adopted and well before any development occurred. The tool for doing this is the modeling of 
sales prices of single-family homes in the City of Atlanta over the 2000 to 2006 period.2 While 
planning and public discussion of the Beltline project began in 2003, the TIF was not formally 
adopted until November of 2005. 
 A broader goal of this paper is to develop a stronger approach to measuring the 
gentrifying impacts of a major state-led development project on lower-income neighborhoods in 
a major U.S. city. Much of the literature on property value impact modeling has not been closely 
linked to the broader gentrification literature. In fact, much work on property value modeling has 
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assumed that higher property values are desired policy outcomes, with little regard for adverse 
consequences in the form of displacement.  More specifically, little work has examined the 
potential gentrification and displacement effects of tax increment financing, which has become a 
key tool for redevelopment in U.S. cities. 
 A good deal of research has examined the role of spatially targeted state-led 
redevelopment projects in engendering, fueling, and shaping gentrification. Smith’s (1996) 
classic descriptions of first-wave gentrification in places like Philadelphia’s Society Hill provide 
prime examples. More recently Goetz (2003), Hackworth (2007) and Keating (2000) have 
documented the role that public housing “transformations” in places such as Minneapolis, 
Chicago and Atlanta in facilitating localized displacement and gentrification.  While funded and 
supported by the federal HOPE VI program, these projects have been locally driven and 
controlled, typically by local housing authorities closely allied with municipal administrations.  
State-led gentrification is of course not solely a U.S. phenomenon. Davidson and Lees (2005), 
for example, document the “dramatic transformation” of London’s riverside as a result of 
intervention by the Greater London Authority; Slater (2004) exposes how the City of Toronto 
facilitated gentrification in South Parkdale by prohibiting certain multifamily housing 
arrangements; and Wong (2006) describes the highly orchestrated redevelopment of Singapore’s 
Waterfront organized by its Urban Redevelopment Authority.  
Despite the substantial literature liking spatially targeted development and gentrification, 
and despite the fact that TIFs are often the primary financing tool available to local government 
in the U.S. for subsidizing redevelopment projects, there has been relatively little discussion of 
the effects of TIFs on property values in lower-income communities or of gentrification more 
specifically.  Some exceptions include Quigley (2007) and Weber (2003), although these papers 
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provide no empirical evidence on the issue. One paper that does attempt to measure TIF-induced 
effects on nearby property values is Weber, Bhatta, and Merriman (2007), in which the authors 
find that proximity to TIFs focused on industrial development actually lead to reduced residential 
property values in Chicago, but that TIFs involving a mix of residential and commercial property 
led to higher values in nearby neighborhoods. However, the scale of individual TIFs in Chicago 
is very small compared to the very large, multipurpose TIF that has been adopted for the Atlanta 
Beltline. Thus, the scale of the impacts might be expected to be substantially larger in the 
Beltline case. 
 In the local Atlanta media, concerns about gentrification and displacement have been 
raised around the Beltline project specifically, particularly by groups advocating for lower-
income residents in neighborhoods in and around the southern and western parts of the Beltline 
TIF (Karson, 2007; Shalhoup, 2007). There have been anecdotal discussions that the Beltline had 
already spurred property value increases in nearby neighborhoods even before the November 
2005 adoption of the TIF. 
Of course, the stimulation of higher property values in neighborhoods surrounding the 
TIF may be desired by development officials and TIF proponents.  Moreover, if a TIF can 
generate additional property tax revenues in areas outside the TIF district, these revenues may 
offset the effective diversion of future tax revenues in the TIF away from general revenue 
budgets for local governments and school systems.  However, if the gains in tax revenues in 
nearby neighborhoods come at the expense of lower-income residents in these neighborhoods, 
then this raises serious concerns about issues of tax equity and potential displacement. 
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Tax Increment Financing and Third-Wave, State-Led Gentrification 
Tax increment financing (TIF) is a development finance tool authorized by state-level 
government in the U.S. that has generally been promoted as an economic development tool 
designed to spur job creation and the “revitalization” of underdeveloped or blighted areas.  TIF is 
not a new development finance tool. It dates back to at least 1952, when California adopted it as 
a way to match federal grants (Dye and Merriman, 2006).  But until the late 1980s, it was not a 
widely used public financing scheme.  In the U.S., beginning in the Carter and especially the 
Reagan administrations, federal intervention in urban development – part of a broader Keynesian 
liberal policy system – was generally dismantled in favor of a minimalist or laissez faire federal 
approach to cities. In addition to the earlier dismantling of direct grant programs like the Urban 
Development Action Grants, the 1986 Tax Reform Act placed severe restrictions on the use of 
industrial revenue bonds, which had been widely used to spur central city revitalization.  
In this era of “second wave” gentrification (Hackworth and Smith, 2001), redevelopment 
often was of a small-scale, “mom and pop” nature at least as compared to the larger-scale, state-
led third-wave type. State and local government solutions often relied on “getting out of the 
way” of private capital via concepts like enterprise or foreign trade zones.  
During and after a recession-induced pause in gentrification in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Hackworth and Smith, 2001), local government found itself needing to play a stronger 
role in prompting and leading redevelopment initiatives. Deregulatory moves by themselves 
proved insufficient for luring investors into central cities at sufficient scale. Local governments 
began deploying their own sources of project-specific subsidy for spurring capital investment, 
with an eye toward priming their overall tax bases. In many cities in the U.S., TIFs became a 
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principal – if not the principal – development finance tool that could be controlled and utilized 
by local government. 
Today, all but two states allow for some form of tax increment financing, although the 
use of TIFs varies widely across states. Minnesota, for example, has more than 2,000 TIF 
districts. The city perhaps best known for the widespread use of TIFs is Chicago, which as of 
2005 had 136 TIF districts (Quigley, 2005). Cook County as a whole, in which Chicago sits, had 
373 TIFs at this time. 
Tax increment financing involves the designation of a geographic area (commonly 
referred to as a “TIF district”) in which the taxable value of real estate (and sometimes other 
taxes) is frozen at pre-development levels, so that increases in property taxes that follow the 
development (commonly referred to as the “increment”) is dedicated to financing development in 
the TIF district. In one common approach, the increment is used to amortize a revenue bond that 
funds capital investment in the district. This might include infrastructure, but also might include 
subsidies for privately owned commercial or residential real estate or other property. However, 
TIFs can involve other financing schemes. For example, the City of Chicago frequently uses a 
“pay as you go” approach to front-funding TIF projects, in which private developers obtain their 
own financing (typically bank loans), using the promise of future TIF proceeds later on to obtain 
the loans (Weber, 2003). The lenders require warrants from the City as part of the developer’s 
loan package. The City has done this in part to limit its overall debt exposure and to place more 
risk on the backs of developers rather than the city or bond investors. 
TIF financing is used at a variety of spatial and financial scales. Cities have frequently 
designed TIFs that are relatively small – on the order of a few adjacent neighborhoods or below. 
For example, Chicago’s 136 TIFs together only account for 26 percent of the city’s land area 
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(Quigley, 2007), while the Beltline TIF alone accounts for 8 percent of Atlanta’s. Of course, 
Atlanta’s land area is less than 60 percent of the City of Chicago’s, but the average TIF in 
Chicago is less than 280 acres, with many much smaller than this.  
The beauty of the TIF tool from the pro-redevelopment local government’s perspective is 
twofold. First, although broadly authorized at the state level, it is essentially controlled by local 
government. The approval of a TIF is generally accomplished by approval of local taxing bodies 
(in the U.S., this principally means municipal and county government and the local school 
system). Because political control of these three governmental bodies is often held by political 
allies (or appointees in the cases of many urban school systems) of municipal government, the 
urban power structure controls the allocation of TIF resources.  The second major advantage of 
TIF funding is its “flexibility;” there are relatively few bureaucratic restrictions imposed by 
higher levels of government regarding what the funds can be used for. This contrasts to the 
generally elaborate qualification and control schemes employed in federal transfer monies to 
cities in the U.S. such as Community Development Block Grants, Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits, New Markets Tax Credits, and others. 
 
Proximity to TIFs and Housing Prices: Causation or Capture? 
If a TIF brings positive amenities to residents of an area – for example by eliminating 
blight or increasing urban amenities such as retail stores, parks, or transit services – then 
residential values within and near the TIF may be expected to increase. In general, identifying 
the extent to which TIFs affect nearby property values is difficult because it is possible that 
planners will attempt to designate TIFs in areas where property values are expected to grow even 
without the designation of the TIF, thereby capturing anticipated, increased revenue streams that 
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can diverted to development purposes and away from conventional uses, such as schools and 
basic public services (Quigley, 2007).  Due to the spatial correlation of housing price trends, this 
means that TIFs might be designated in areas where they are likely to be surrounded by 
appreciating neighborhoods. In analytical terms, this means that the geographic parameters of the 
TIF are possibly endogenous, and not exogenous, to neighboring property value trends.  
 Weber (2003) discusses the question of the endogeneity of TIF designation and location 
as one of two competing hypotheses: “pure attribution” versus “pure capture.” The former 
hypothesis assumes that the TIF causes all changes in values associate with the TIF. The latter 
assumes that the all changes in values would have occurred without the TIF and that the TIF is a 
device to capture revenues going to other purposes and redirect them toward subsidizing the 
development project. The empirical research on causation versus capture is equivocal at this 
point.  Dye and Merriman (2000), for example, find that the adoption of TIFs has a negative 
effect on municipal property tax revenue, giving support to the capture hypothesis, while Byrne 
(2005) finds that TIFs are not used to capture or divert revenue from preexisting uses. 
 There are at least two reasons why the location of the Beltline TIF is treated here as 
exogenous to housing price trends, so that housing price changes are attributed to the TIF 
designation, and not the other way around. The first is the research method used here, which 
looks at changes in property values after serious public planning about the Beltline began, and 
compares such changes near the Beltline to changes in places farther from the Beltline.  Of 
course, if officials were able to anticipate the geographic patterns of future property value trends, 
then this method may remain insufficient to assert exogeneity. The second, and more 
theoretically compelling, reason to treat the Beltline location as exogenous is the fact that the 
location of the Beltline was not simply chosen by development officials from a wide variety of 
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potential locations for a large TIF, but was determined primarily by the location of the chain of 
pre-existing railroad rights of way and the large parcels of land surrounding them. While 
officials could influence the precise boundaries of the TIF, the constraints of the original rights 
of way used to assemble the TIF significantly constrained their ability to define the general 
parameters of the TIF district. Thus, the Beltline TIF presents an excellent case study for which 
to test the anticipatory impacts of property values of a large-scale multipurpose TIF-funded 
project. 
 
Anticipating Housing Price Impacts: The Announcement Effect of Planning a Major 
Redevelopment Project 
From the period of initial conceptualization and discussion to the period of formal 
adoption and implementation, the planning process for a large-scale redevelopment project such 
as the Atlanta Beltline can extend for several, if not many, years.  Moreover, such large-scale 
projects may be expected by the typical real estate investor to have much greater impact on long-
term property value trajectories than smaller, incremental public interventions. Therefore, any 
model that is designed to ascertain the effects of “a project,” should actually be designed to 
measure the impact of a somewhat drawn out planning process. This raises two issues from a 
methodological perspective. First, any effect on property values in or near the target 
redevelopment area may be spurred more by the announcement of the intended project rather 
than its formal adoption or its implementation.  For this reason, a good deal of research on the 
impacts of large-scale development projects has focused on changes before and after the 
announcement of the project.   
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Second, in some cases, there is no clear, singular “announcement” point. Rather, projects 
often begin with various broad conceptual ideas, often with quite limited likelihood of 
materializing.  As the planning process becomes more serious, public discussion and media 
attention are likely to begin and grow. By this point, and perhaps earlier, we would expect 
investors to become more interested in the potential revalorization of land in and near the 
proposed target area and perhaps begin investing accordingly in nearby properties.  However, at 
these early stages there may be a substantial amount of uncertainty over the eventual 
implementation of the project, and thus investors, in turn, may have a good deal of uncertainty 
over the magnitude of the rent gap.  Therefore, property values may not begin reflecting the 
large-scale initiation of speculation until more public discussion and planning occurs. 
A good deal of research has addressed questions regarding the extent to which 
externalities, both positive and negative, of public sector investment or subsidy projects are 
capitalized into land and property values in surrounding or adjacent areas or neighborhoods. The 
empirical literature suggests that these externalities—either positive or negative—are at least 
partially capitalized into land and property values, and that this capitalization can begin to occur 
well before the project is physically initiated or completed.  
For example, Knaap, Ding and Hopkins (2001) specifically seek to estimate whether the 
information contained in transportation plans is capitalized into land values near prospective 
transit stations. They find that the impact of light rail investments on land values in Washington 
County, Oregon closely followed the announcement of the new stations’ locations.  Dehring, 
Depken and Ward (2006) test the impact of the announcement of a major sports stadium on local 
housing prices. Colwell, Dehring and Lash (2000) examine the announcement effects of group 
homes on housing prices. Jud and Winkler (2006) estimate the announcement effect of an airport 
 11
expansion on housing prices in the Winston Salem area, and Gatzlaff and Smith (1993) measure 
the impact of the announcement of a new rail system on prices in Miami.  
In general, however, this literature utilizes a before-announcement, after-announcement 
dichotomous variable to classify the timing of property sales and so constrains the pricing effect 
to occur at a particular point in time. As will be described later in the description of the 
methodology, in this analysis I track changes in the trajectories of regression-adjusted property 
values over time and compare these changes to public discussion of the Beltline as measured by 
coverage in the local media. This allows for a more detailed comparison of property value 
trajectories for various distances from the Beltline to the timeline of early and later media 
coverage of the project. 
 
The Beltline TIF and Housing Price Trends in the City of Atlanta 
The Atlanta Development Authority, the quasipublic development agency that planned 
and designated the Beltline TIF, has projected that the TIF will eventually generate sufficient 
incremental tax revenue to fund approximately $1.3 to $1.7 billion in tax exempt bonds over 25 
years and that these bonds will provide from 50 to 70 percent of the development costs of the 
Beltline project (Atlanta Development Authority, 2005). The remaining funds will come from 
traditional bank financing of developer projects, other public monies for parks and infrastructure, 
and potentially some private investment funds. TIF bonds will be used to pay for capital costs for 
transit, trails and parks, but some funds are slated to be made available for “workforce housing, 
quality development in underserved communities, environmental clean-up and transportation 
connectivity (including street, sidewalk and streetscape improvements) in neighborhoods close to 
the Beltline.”  
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Atlanta has typically employed its TIFs to stimulate private development – both 
commercial and residential – by using proceeds from TIF bonds as direct subsidies in private 
economic and real estate development projects. However, the proposal for the Beltline TIF is 
somewhat different in that the bulk of funds are intended to go towards uses such as public 
transit, infrastructure, parks and related site preparation, and open space, with some set-aside of 
funds for affordable “workforce” housing as well as for streetscape improvements and local 
economic development projects in lower-income neighborhoods.  Although the majority of the 
dollars coming from this TIF are to be ostensibly used for more public purposes, such as parks 
and transit, if these amenities have value to local residents and businesses, then we should expect 
that a good deal of the added value of these services will spillover to the values of nearby 
residential properties, as people will be willing to pay rents and land prices to locate near these 
improved amenities. 
Figure 1 provides two maps that describe the basic housing demography of the City of 
Atlanta vis-à-vis the Beltline TIF district.  The TIF district encircles the central business district 
and is approximately 4 miles west to east and six miles north to south. The left side map shows 
that tracts on the north and northeast sides of the city generally had 1999 median family incomes 
roughly at or above the metropolitan median ($59,313 in 1999), with many tracts quite a bit 
higher than this, especially on the far north part of the city generally known as Buckhead. The 
northeast neighborhoods of Ansley Park and Morningside are also relatively affluent.  At the 
other end of the socioeconomic spectrum are neighborhoods on the south and west sides of the 
city, including such areas as Pittsburgh, Peoplestown, the West End, Oakland City. Most of these 
tracts had median family incomes below $40,000 in 1999, with many having medians below 
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$25,000. Many tracts in the hub of the somewhat circular TIF district also have quite low median 
incomes.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 Figure 1 also shows the housing unit density of the city vis-à-vis the TIF district. It 
illustrates that most neighborhoods near the TIF have comparatively intensive residential use, 
although the actual parcels in the TIF itself are predominantly nonresidential. The northwest 
portion of the TIF is substantially less residentially intensive, with a good deal of industrial and 
low-intensity commercial land use.  Thus, the “northern arc” of the TIF, as it is sometimes 
called, is predominantly adjacent to either higher-income neighborhoods or ones that are mostly 
industrial or commercial.  Conversely, the southern arc of the Beltline predominantly touches on 
lower-income residential neighborhoods, many of which are predominantly minority. The 
poverty rates in these southern tracts are typically very high, frequently exceeding twenty to 
thirty percent of residents or more below the poverty level. 
Figure 2 illustrates a series of buffers that lie at different distances from the TIF, 
including an eighth of a mile, a quarter of a mile, a half of a mile, one mile, and two miles. These 
buffers will be used to identify price trends and premiums for single-family homes located at 
different distances from the Beltline TIF. If the TIF affects surrounding property values, we 
should expect this impact to be stronger for properties that are very close (e.g. less than a quarter 
of a mile, for example) to the TIF than for those farther from it. This figure also illustrates parts 
of the buffers that are north or south of the CBD (“northside” vs. “southside”). This will be 
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important because we may expect different sorts of impacts in southside parts of the buffers vs. 
those on the northside, given the initially lower residential property values on the southside. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Since 2000, the city of Atlanta has generally seen substantial increases in single-family 
property values, with median price increasing by 12.4 percent annually from 2000 through 2006. 
Figure 3 illustrates the average annual increase in median sales prices of single-family homes by 
neighborhood planning unit (NPU) in the city of Atlanta for the 2000 to 2006 period.  These data 
represent all sales of single-family, detached properties with a sale price of at least $5,000, with 
some types of sales excluded in which the nature of the transaction would be expected to have 
very large impacts on price were excluded.3  Median prices generally increased the most in 
NPUs on the south and west sides of the city. As shown in the figure, the Beltline TIF runs 
through or near many of these neighborhoods. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 1 shows that median sales price in the Beltline and within one-eighth of a mile of 
the Beltline increased by more than 130 percent (or about 15 percent annually) over the six year 
period. The median sale price of properties in the buffer from one-quarter to one-half of a mile 
also increased at about 15 percent (14.7 percent) annually.  The median price for properties in the 
eighth-to-quarter-mile buffer increased at almost 11 percent (10.5 percent) annually, while the 
median for homes in the 1 to 1.5 miles buffer rose by 9.8 percent annually, and the median for 
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the 1.5 to 2 mile buffer rose at an 8.6 percent annual rate.  The median for homes outside of the 2 
mile buffer, but still in the city, rose at only a 4.7 percent annual rate. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Data and Methods for Measuring the Announcement Effects of the Beltline Project 
The announcement and planning of a large project such as the Beltline may be as much a 
process as an event. That is, the precise date at which one might call the project “announced” is 
unclear. Initial concepts for the Beltline, for example, have been attributed to a masters student in 
city and regional planning at Georgia Tech doing his major paper on the concept in late 1999. 
However, there was no public discussion of the Beltline plan or a significant proposal by a public 
official for approximately three years after this.  Even when discussion of the project began in 
the media, its scale and scope were not completely defined. 
As a result, rather than attempting to identify clearly delineated pre- and post-
announcement periods by which to classify home sales, I do not constrain the appreciation trends 
but rather compare these trends and their spatial variations to the timing of public discussion of 
the Beltline project, as measured by coverage in the major daily print media in Atlanta, the 
Atlanta Journal Constitution (AJC).  
I begin with a fairly standard pricing model: 
 
ln(pi) = α + βlnFi + χlnLi + ψQi + ζGi + φGi2 + δSi +ρTi + γRi + ηEi + ϕDi + κNi + εi (1) 
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where pi is the price of home i, Fi is the square footage of the home i; Li is the square footage of 
land area for the lot for home i; Qi is a set of dummy variables indicating the quality/condition of 
the property (ranging from “excellent” to “unsound”); Gi is the age of the property in years at the 
time of sale;  Si is a set of transaction dummies that describe special conditions of the sale (e.g., 
involves a nonprofit, etc.); Ti is a time variable implemented by a set of quarterly dummy 
variables; Ri is a vector of variables describing physical attributes of the property such as the 
number of bathrooms, bedrooms and stories, as well as exterior construction type and foundation 
type; Ei is a vector of variables describing the socioeconomic characteristics of the census block 
group in which the property is located; Di indicates the distance of the property from the central 
business district; and Ni indicates how far north of the CBD the property lies (N is negative if the 
property lies south of the CBD).  
In order to expand the model to identify the effect of proximity to the Beltline TIF on 
price over time, the specification in equation (1) is expanded to incorporate additional spatial 
variables that indicate the location of the property relative the Beltline TIF. These variables are 
then interacted with the year of the sale. This approach, sometimes referred to as a switching 
regression, effectively allows the relationship between the spatial phenomenon (including 
proximity to the north- or south-sides of the TIF) and housing prices to change over time, 
providing a fine-grained analysis of spatial variations in appreciation (McDonald and McMillan, 
2004). The new model is as follows: 
 
ln(pi) = α + βlnFi + χlnLi + ψQi + ζGi + φGi2 + δSi +ρTi + γRi + ηEi + ϕDi + κNi +  
+ ζBBi + ΦDi*Ai + ΨNi*Ai  +  λBiB *Ai + εi      (2) 
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where BBi is a set of dummy variables indicating the buffer segment that property i lies within; 
and Ai is year of sale, operationalized by dummy variables for years 2001 through 2006 (2000 is 
the omitted year). In addition to interacting the buffer location dummies with the year of sale, the 
distance from the CBD and distance north of the CBD are interacted with a year of sale.  
To operationalize Bi, each sale is allocated to one of the 15 buffer categories listed in 
Table 2, including: the northside of the TIF, the southside of the TIF, one of the six northside 
TIF buffers, one of the six southside TIF buffers, or the part of the city that is more than 2 miles 
from the TIF. Therefore, BBi is a set of 14 dummy variables, with the area more than two miles 
from the TIF being the omitted, fifteenth category. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Estimating equation (2) enables us to identify the change in prices each year in each 
buffer segment.  By examining the coefficients of the interaction terms, we can identify whether 
properties close to the Beltline experienced a boost in sales more or less than farther properties 
and compare these patterns to the timing of the press and discussion of the Beltline.  
The data used to estimate equation (2) come primarily from two principal Fulton County 
data sets, as well as decennial census data.  First is a parcel-level data set that includes building 
attributes for every parcel in the county. Second is a series of records describing real estate sales 
in Fulton County from 2000 to 2006 provided by the Fulton County Tax Assessor. These two 
data sets were merged by parcel identification number and checked for accuracy. Parcels with 
detached single-family buildings were used in the analysis. After this, a variety of sales were 
excluded from the data used in the estimation, including those with prices of less than $5,000 or 
transactions or properties considered fundamentally distinct from conventional individual-to-
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individual property transactions. These include transactions involving one or more of the 
following: relatives, divorce, or related companies; legal difficulties or foreclosure; a bank as 
seller/buyer; land contracts or a quit claim deed or that did not include clear title; a person with 
adjoining property; property that was burned or razed after the sale; a deed of gift; persons 
having adjoining property; burned or razed property after sale; trades of property; portfolio sales; 
partial interests; life estates; or multiple parcels that were sold together for an overall price (so 
that a per-unit price was unavailable). These operations resulted in a data set of more than 25,000 
sales for 2000 to 2006. 
To determine whether the public discussion and planning surrounding the Beltline 
affected prices of homes near the Beltline compared to prices of similar homes farther from the 
Beltline, I examine the coverage of the Beltline project in the local press in Atlanta, and then 
compare the growth of this coverage to changes in sales price premiums for properties close to 
the Beltline.  Even modest amounts of press coverage could initiate speculation or anticipation 
around potential valuation shifts in areas near the Beltline, especially when the plans involve a 
very large project.   
Figure 4 indicates the number of articles in the Atlanta Journal Constitution (AJC), the 
major Atlanta daily paper, mentioning the Beltline proposal or project from 2001 through 2005. 
(The Beltline TIF was formerly adopted in November 2005). There were no articles on the 
Beltline concept or project in the AJC until December 2002. In early 2003, a few more articles 
appeared, and by mid-to-late 2004, coverage became more frequent. Thus, in examining changes 
in price trends for different buffer segments in the results of estimating equation (2), we will be 
looking particularly at the period from 2003 to 2005. 
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[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Estimation Results 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation of equation 
(2) and Table 4 provides the regression results. Due to the geographic structure of the data, the 
OLS results exhibit some heteroskedasticity, so a heteroskedastic-robust standard error is 
measured and used to determine significance.4  In addition to standard error and t-statistics, 
Table 4 provides an adjusted exponentiated transform of the coefficient, following Kennedy 
(1981). This transform allows for easier interpretation of the proportional impact on the 
dependent variable that is expected from a one unit change in the independent variable. The 
model achieves a relatively good overall fit (R-square = 0.78) and the coefficients for most 
impendent variables for structural and neighborhood characteristics come in significant and with 
the expected sign. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The variables of interest here are those involving the buffer dummies and the interaction 
terms, in which the buffer dummies are interacted with the year of sale (2000 is the omitted 
year). Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the key results for these variables for the expanded pricing model 
in Table 4. These figures indicate the impact of being in different buffer segments – for both the 
north and south sides – on cumulative appreciation relative to 2000.  Thus, these graphs 
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represent the change in appreciation due to location vis-à-vis the Beltline TIF, with other 
property characteristics held constant. 
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Northside TIF buffer segments, while appreciating significantly, roughly followed the 
trajectory of properties located outside of the two-mile TIF buffer (both on the north and south 
sides).  On the northside, most of the statistically significant differences in appreciation were 
actually ones in which areas near the TIF appreciated more slowly than the outer area. Of the TIF 
buffers on the northside that were within a mile of the TIF, only the quarter-to-half mile buffer 
saw an significantly higher levels of appreciation over the 2000 to 2006 period, and this was just 
in 2006.  These findings suggest that the impacts of the TIF on nearby property values occurred 
primarily in lower-value and lower-income buffer areas, which are located primarily on the city’s 
southside. This is consistent with a notion of the Beltline project spurring speculation and 
gentrification in lower-income areas very close to the TIF district. 
To focus more on southside pricing effects, Figure 7 illustrates the sales price premiums 
for 2000 through 2006 due to being located in each of the southside TIF buffers compared to 
being located more than two miles from the TIF. Those premiums whose magnitudes are labeled 
are statistically significant at less than p=0.10. (Precise levels of significance can be found in 
Table 4.) It shows that properties sold in or within a quarter mile of the TIF on the south side 
generally sold for considerably higher prices than properties farther away in 2004, 2005, and 
2006. (The price premium for properties in the eighth-mile buffer was also significant in 2003.)  
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These premiums were substantial, with properties in 2004 within a quarter mile of the TIF selling 
for 29-31 percent higher than otherwise-similar outer-area properties.  Importantly, such 
differences were much smaller, and not statistically significant, for 2001 and 2002 and only 
partly significant for 2003. 
 
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Price premiums for proximity to the Beltline on the southside fall off after one-half mile. 
Moreover, premiums for the quarter-to-half mile buffer are not substantially higher after public 
discussion of the Beltline than before such discussion. However, within one-quarter of a mile of 
the TIF – an area with very high single-family density – the differences in premiums from before 
to after Beltline proposals were made public are very large, and on the order of 10 to 20 
percentage point increase within a year. Moreover, the premiums generally continued to increase 
in 2005. In 2006, the premiums generally flattened off, except in the case of properties within an 
eighth of a mile of the TIF, whose premium continued to grow. 
 
Conclusions 
The results here that the planning and public discussion of the Beltline TIF had positive 
effects on housing prices very close to the TIF on the city’s south side, with impacts falling off 
sharply after approximately a quarter mile. The timing of these increases matches the timing of 
the initial public discussion of the Beltline. More specifically, the analysis suggests that, 
beginning as early as 2003, homes located very close to the southern part of the Beltline TIF 
experienced substantial increases in locational price premiums. The increases in price premiums 
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for being located within a quarter-mile of the TIF on the southside generally increased on the 
order of 15 to 30 percentage points over the 2002-2005 period.   
These findings have a implications for planning and policy concerning large-scale TIFs 
and other large, spatially targeted development projects in lower-income areas. First, the findings 
suggest that projects of this scale and nature have positive spillovers on residential property 
values. While this may please the designers of such initiatives, these sorts of effects may not 
always please lower-income residents of affected communities. While some – especially those 
who own property and can afford higher taxes – may welcome higher property values, others – 
including some lower-income owners – may not, particularly if they desire to remain in the area 
and will have difficulty affording higher taxes.  Lower-income renters, whose new leases are 
likely to reflect higher tax assessments and higher property values, will almost certainly 
experience some pressure toward displacement.    
The impacts here have been significant in magnitude for lower-income owner-occupiers 
as well as renters. Many lower-income homeowners, for example, near the TIF have seen their 
taxes increase substantially in recent years. Given current residential tax rates and homestead 
exemption levels in Atlanta, a somewhat typical homeowner with a house worth $100,000 in 
2001 and located within an eighth of a mile of the TIF would see her property taxes increase 
from approximately $540 in 2001 to over $1,400 by 2006. A property owner with a similar 
$100,000 house but located just a little farther away from the TIF – 1 mile – would see her taxes 
go up as well, but only to approximately $950. This is an increase in property taxes of 160 
percent over five years instead of an increase of 74 percent. Given the very large population of 
low-income homeowners, this is a sizeable increase in housing costs, one that is very likely to 
result in significant displacement of incumbent residents. 
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This analysis suggests that the impacts on residential land values from large, state-led 
development or redevelopment projects may be substantial, particularly in lower-income 
neighborhoods. Moreover, these impacts may occur well before formal policies are adopted or 
ground is broken. If such initiatives are intended to help the incumbent residents of the 
surrounding areas and/or there is a desire to maintain a supply of affordable housing in these 
areas, then substantial planning and policy attention is warranted early in the process to mitigate 
potential gentrification and displacement.  
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 Table 1. Median Prices and Counts for Single Family Home Sales, 2000 – 2006 by proximity to the 
Beltline TIF, City of Atlanta, Fulton County Sales Only 
 
  
 
2000 
 
 
2001 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
 
2004 
 
 
2005 
 
 
2006 
Increase in 
Median Price 
2000-2006 
Average 
Annual 
Increase 
In the Beltline 103,000 135,000 152,500 155,000 180,000 230,000 240,000 133.0% 15.1% 
# Sales  203 184 166 201 270 284 264     
Within 1/8 mile 95,000 120,000 150,000 167,000 176,000 215,000 220,000 131.6% 15.0% 
# Sales  1,946 1,797 1,809 1,613 2,353 2,513 2,134     
1/8 to 1/4 mile 123,500 137,000 149,900 173,304 186,000 220,000 225,250 82.4% 10.5% 
# Sales  699 679 706 635 841 982 869     
1/4 to 1/2 mile 95,500 134,000 130,000 159,900 175,500 205,000 218,000 128.3% 14.7% 
# Sales  730 681 690 679 834 945 848     
1/2 to 1 mile 80,000 85,000 103,400 131,000 136,949 150,000 155,000 93.8% 11.7% 
# Sales  549 570 604 560 713 772 773     
1 to 1.5 miles 88,500 98,950 107,000 140,000 141,000 142,000 155,000 75.1% 9.8% 
# Sales  396 366 477 445 554 600 636     
1.5 to 2 miles 88,314 120,000 133,620 130,000 132,500 142,000 145,000 64.2% 8.6% 
# Sales  400 409 425 457 532 575 578     
2 or more miles 110,000 119,000 116,955 123,600 139,000 146,900 145,000 31.8% 4.7% 
# Sales  934 815 788 901 1,147 1,313 1,332     
City Total 96,000 116,500 134,000 150,000 160,000 181,584 194,014 102.1% 12.4% 
# Sales  5,857 5,501 5,665 5,491 7,244 7,984 7,434     
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Table 2.  Buffer Segments Used to Categorize Single Family Home Sales 
  
Northside – in the TIF Southside – in the TIF 
Northside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF Southside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF 
Northside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF Southside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF 
Northside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF Southside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF 
Northside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF Southside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF 
Northside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF Southside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF 
Northside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF Southside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF 
More than 2 miles from TIF  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
log of price 12.253 0.874 
log of building square feet 7.374 0.503 
log of square feet of land 9.285 0.668 
number of bedrooms 2.923 0.900 
number of bathrooms 1.864 1.044 
quality=excellent 0.184 0.388 
quality=very good 0.276 0.447 
quality=good 0.203 0.402 
quality=average/fair 0.323 0.468 
quality=poor 0.011 0.102 
quality=very poor 0.002 0.043 
quality=unsound 0.002 0.040 
age of house 52.5 25.0 
more than 1 story 0.157 0.364 
brick exterior 0.369 0.483 
full basement 0.225 0.418 
trans=public/nonprofit involved 0.019 0.136 
trans=remodeled 0.023 0.149 
trans=additional property 0.001 0.033 
trans=not typical of local  0.155 0.362 
trans=incomplete 0.004 0.067 
trans=split parcel 0.000 0.009 
block group, proportion black 0.579 0.413 
block group, proportion Hispanic 0.037 0.059 
block group, proportion poor 0.204 0.154 
block group, proportion owner-occupied 0.548 0.230 
block group, median household income 48,316 37,583 
distance to CBD in miles 4.310 2.043 
distance north (south <0) of CBD in miles 0.598 3.659 
Northside – in the TIF 0.013 0.111 
Northside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF  0.109 0.312 
Northside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF 0.061 0.239 
Northside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF 0.068 0.252 
Northside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF 0.058 0.233 
Northside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF 0.049 0.217 
Northside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF 0.049 0.216 
Southside – in the TIF 0.020 0.139 
Southside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF 0.182 0.386 
Southside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF 0.059 0.236 
Southside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF 0.053 0.224 
Southside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF 0.043 0.203 
Southside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF 0.027 0.163 
Southside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF 0.028 0.166 
N = 25,999
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Table 4.  Heteroskedastic-Robust OLS Results of Expanded Model, Including Beltline Proximity 
Variables, Pre-Post Beltline Announcement, and Interactionsa
 
Dependent Variable = Natural log of Price 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Error Beta 
Effect of Unit Change 
in IV on Priceb t-stat Significance 
 
Constant 8.417 0.107     78.43 0.000 *** 
log of building square feet 0.360 0.014 0.207   25.50 0.000 ***
log of square feet of land 0.140 0.008 0.107   17.96 0.000 ***
number of bedrooms -0.008 0.004 -0.008   -1.85 0.065 *
number of bathrooms 0.085 0.005 0.102 0.089 15.96 0.000 ***
quality=very good -0.139 0.008 -0.071 -0.130 -17.19 0.000 ***
quality=good -0.258 0.011 -0.119 -0.227 -24.24 0.000 ***
quality=average/fair -0.408 0.011 -0.218 -0.335 -36.26 0.000 ***
quality=poor -0.586 0.041 -0.068 -0.444 -14.41 0.000 ***
quality=very poor -0.689 0.112 -0.034 -0.499 -6.15 0.000 ***
quality=unsound -0.626 0.164 -0.029 -0.466 -3.81 0.000 ***
age of house -5.42E-03 0.001 -0.155 -5.41E-03 -8.31 0.000 ***
age of house squared 5.26E-05 0.000 0.141 5.26E-05 7.69 0.000 ***
more than 1 story 0.087 0.010 0.036 0.091 8.88 0.000 ***
brick exterior 0.053 0.006 0.029 0.055 8.91 0.000 ***
full basement 0.021 0.007 0.010 0.021 2.99 0.003 ***
trans=public/nonprofit involved -0.412 0.032 -0.064 -0.338 -12.99 0.000 ***
trans=remodeled -0.201 0.024 -0.034 -0.182 -8.40 0.000 ***
trans=additional property 0.389 0.094 0.015 0.471 4.16 0.000 ***
trans=not typical of local  -0.111 0.011 -0.046 -0.105 -9.85 0.000 ***
trans=incomplete 0.221 0.041 0.017 0.246 5.43 0.000 ***
trans=split parcel 1.626 3.168 0.016 3.867 0.51 0.608 
block group, proportion Black -0.608 0.017 -0.287 -0.456 -35.27 0.000 ***
block group, proportion Hispanic -1.008 0.055 -0.068 -0.636 -18.45 0.000 ***
block group, proportion poor -0.261 0.033 -0.046 -0.230 -7.95 0.000 ***
block group, prop. owner-occupied -0.180 0.019 -0.047 -0.165 -9.66 0.000 ***
block group, median household income 1.85E-06 0.000 0.079 1.85E-06 10.91 0.000 ***
distance to CBD in miles 0.016 0.007 0.037 0.016 2.41 0.016 ***
distance north (south <0) of CBD in miles 0.032 0.003 0.134 0.032 10.41 0.000 ***
quarter 2 0.009 0.024 0.002 0.009 0.38 0.706 
quarter 3 0.016 0.026 0.003 0.016 0.61 0.543 
quarter 4 0.042 0.030 0.007 0.042 1.42 0.157 
quarter 5 0.104 0.050 0.017 0.109 2.07 0.039 *
quarter 6 0.201 0.049 0.035 0.222 4.07 0.000 ***
quarter 7 0.188 0.049 0.031 0.205 3.82 0.000 ***
quarter 8 0.223 0.049 0.034 0.248 4.54 0.000 ***
quarter 9 0.271 0.054 0.050 0.310 5.00 0.000 ***
quarter 10 0.310 0.055 0.056 0.362 5.63 0.000 ***
quarter 11 0.323 0.055 0.056 0.379 5.87 0.000 ***
quarter 12 0.307 0.055 0.052 0.358 5.59 0.000 ***
quarter 13 0.311 0.057 0.056 0.363 5.42 0.000 ***
quarter 14 0.316 0.058 0.063 0.370 5.48 0.000 ***
quarter 15 0.353 0.058 0.069 0.422 6.11 0.000 ***
quarter 16 0.338 0.057 0.064 0.401 5.95 0.000 ***
quarter 17 0.415 0.058 0.091 0.512 7.17 0.000 ***
quarter 18 0.441 0.057 0.103 0.552 7.73 0.000 ***
quarter 19 0.468 0.057 0.104 0.595 8.17 0.000 ***
quarter 20 0.540 0.057 0.125 0.714 9.55 0.000 ***
quarter 21 0.561 0.057 0.140 0.751 9.88 0.000 ***
quarter 22 0 579 0 057 0 154 0 781 10 12 0 000 ***
quarter 23 0.577 0.057 0.154 0.779 10.19 0.000 ***
quarter 24 0.611 0.056 0.159 0.839 10.87 0.000 ***
quarter 25 0.593 0.058 0.161 0.807 10.22 0.000 ***
quarter 26 0.587 0.058 0.170 0.796 10.06 0.000 ***
quarter 27 0.563 0.058 0.159 0.752 9.66 0.000 ***
quarter 28 0.501 0.059 0.110 0.647 8.45 0.000 ***
Northside – in the TIF 0.129 0.087 0.016 0.133 1.47 0.141 
Northside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF  0.193 0.044 0.069 0.212 4.43 0.000 ***
Northside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF 0.276 0.047 0.075 0.316 5.92 0.000 ***
Northside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF 0.123 0.047 0.035 0.130 2.62 0.009 ***
Northside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF 0.170 0.049 0.045 0.184 3.44 0.001 ***
Northside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF 0.062 0.060 0.015 0.063 1.04 0.298 
Northside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF -0.116 0.060 -0.029 -0.111 -1.95 0.052 *
Southside – in the TIF 0.118 0.079 0.019 0.123 1.50 0.133 
Southside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF 0.087 0.042 0.038 0.090 2.06 0.039 **
Southside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF 0.075 0.055 0.020 0.077 1.37 0.172 
Southside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF 0.000 0.058 0.000 -0.001 0.00 0.999 
Southside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF -0.026 0.044 -0.006 -0.027 -0.60 0.549 
Southside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF 0.016 0.052 0.003 0.014 0.31 0.756 
Southside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF 0.082 0.034 0.015 0.083 2.41 0.016 ** 
        
Continued on next page
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Table 4. Continued from previous page 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Error Beta 
Effect of Unit Change 
in IV on Priceb t-stat significance 
 
        
SWITCHING  
– LOCATION*TIME INTERACTIONS       
 
distance to CBD in miles * 2001 -0.015 0.007 -0.023 -0.015 -2.24 0.025 ** 
distance to CBD in miles * 2002 -0.022 0.007 -0.036 -0.022 -3.22 0.001 *** 
distance to CBD in miles * 2003 -0.024 0.007 -0.042 -0.023 -3.29 0.001 *** 
distance to CBD in miles * 2004 -0.027 0.007 -0.056 -0.027 -3.69 0.000 *** 
distance to CBD in miles * 2005 -0.034 0.007 -0.076 -0.034 -4.79 0.000 *** 
distance to CBD in miles * 2006 -0.032 0.007 -0.077 -0.032 -4.42 0.000 *** 
distance north (south <0) of CBD in miles * 2001 
distance north (south <0) of CBD in miles * 2002 
0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.10 0.921 
-0.007 0.004 -0.010 -0.007 -1.77 0.076 * 
distance north (south <0) of CBD in miles * 2003 -0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.68 0.499 
distance north (south <0) of CBD in miles * 2004 -0.008 0.004 -0.013 -0.008 -2.04 0.042 ** 
distance north (south <0) of CBD in miles * 2005 -0.004 0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -1.17 0.241 
distance north (south <0) of CBD in miles * 2006 -0.008 0.004 -0.016 -0.008 -2.13 0.033 ** 
       
NORTHSIDE BUFFER * TIM  INTERACTIONS E
Northside – in the TIF * 2001 
      
0.008 0.121 0.000 0.002 0.07 0.944 
Northside – in the TIF * 2002 0.083 0.127 0.003 0.079 0.66 0.512 
Northside – in the TIF * 2003 -0.100 0.105 -0.005 -0.101 -0.95 0.342 
Northside – in the TIF * 2004 -0.063 0.102 -0.003 -0.066 -0.62 0.538 
Northside – in the TIF * 2005 -0.131 0.096 -0.008 -0.127 -1.36 0.173 
Northside – in the TIF * 2006 0.080 0.113 0.005 0.077 0.71 0.480 
Northside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2001 -0.017 0.049 -0.002 -0.018 -0.35 0.728 
Northside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2002 -0.011 0.050 -0.001 -0.013 -0.23 0.821 
Northside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2003 -0.054 0.051 -0.008 -0.054 -1.07 0.285 
Northside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2004 -0.060 0.049 -0.009 -0.060 -1.24 0.215 
Northside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2005 -0.057 0.048 -0.010 -0.057 -1.19 0.235 
Northside – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2006 0.019 0.049 0.003 0.018 0.40 0.692 
Northside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2001 
Northside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2002 
-0.084 0.057 -0.007 -0.082 -1.47 0.141 
-0.149 0.057 -0.014 -0.140 -2.61 0.009 * * *
* Northside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2003 -0.115 0.059 -0.011 -0.110 -1.96 0.050 
Northside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2004 -0.121 0.052 -0.014 -0.116 -2.32 0.020 ** 
Northside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2005 -0.165 0.052 -0.022 -0.153 -3.18 0.001 *** 
Northside – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2006 -0.010 0.053 -0.001 -0.011 -0.19 0.849 
Northside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2001 -0.032 0.061 -0.003 -0.032 -0.52 0.604 
Northside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2002 -0.005 0.059 0.000 -0.006 -0.08 0.938 
Northside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2003 0.062 0.059 0.007 0.063 1.05 0.292 
Northside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2004 -0.016 0.057 -0.002 -0.017 -0.28 0.782 
Northside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2005 -0.008 0.053 -0.001 -0.009 -0.15 0.878 
Northside – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2006 0.099 0.055 0.013 0.102 1.80 0.071 * 
Northside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2001 
Northside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2002 
-0.113 0.066 -0.009 -0.108 -1.71 0.087 * 
-0.102 0.064 -0.010 -0.099 -1.60 0.110 
Northside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2003 -0.098 0.062 -0.010 -0.095 -1.58 0.114 
Northside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2004 -0.115 0.060 -0.012 -0.110 -1.93 0.054 * 
Northside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2005 -0.128 0.056 -0.016 -0.121 -2.27 0.023 * 
Northside – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2006 0.015 0.056 0.002 0.013 0.26 0.793 
Northside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2001 
Northside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2002 
-0.043 0.074 -0.003 -0.044 -0.58 0.561 
-0.065 0.072 -0.006 -0.065 -0.91 0.365 
Northside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2003 0.009 0.076 0.001 0.007 0.12 0.908 
Northside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2004 -0.015 0.068 -0.001 -0.017 -0.22 0.823 
Northside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2005 -0.033 0.070 -0.004 -0.034 -0.48 0.633 
Northside – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2006 0.028 0.067 0.003 0.026 0.41 0.679 
Northside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2001 
Northside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2002 
0.171 0.071 0.014 0.184 2.42 0.016 ** 
0.117 0.073 0.009 0.122 1.61 0.107 
Northside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2003 0.131 0.075 0.012 0.138 1.75 0.080 * 
Northside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2004 0.091 0.067 0.009 0.093 1.36 0.174 
Northside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2005 0.152 0.064 0.017 0.162 2.36 0.018 ** 
Northside – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2006 0.109 0.069 0.013 0.113 1.58 0.113 
 
Continued on next page
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Table 4. Continued from previous page 
 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
Std. Error Beta 
Effect of Unit Change 
in IV on Priceb t-stat significance 
 
        
SOUTHSIDE BUFFER * TIME INTERACTIONS        
Southside – in the TIF * 2001 0.002 0.137 0.000 -0.003 0.02 0.987 
Southside  – in the TIF * 2002 0.090 0.103 0.004 0.089 0.88 0.380 
Southside  – in the TIF * 2003 -0.004 0.105 0.000 -0.008 -0.04 0.972 
Southside  – in the TIF * 2004 0.146 0.097 0.009 0.153 1.50 0.133 
Southside  – in the TIF * 2005 0.228 0.088 0.018 0.252 2.59 0.010 *  *
* Southside  – in the TIF * 2006 0.167 0.090 0.014 0.178 1.86 0.063 
Southside  – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2001 
Southside  – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2002 
0.066 0.046 0.009 0.067 1.44 0.149 
0.063 0.049 0.009 0.064 1.29 0.198 
Southside  – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2003 0.125 0.048 0.018 0.132 2.60 0.009 *** 
Southside  – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2004 0.181 0.048 0.035 0.198 3.81 0.000 *** 
Southside  – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2005 0.239 0.047 0.056 0.269 5.12 0.000 *** 
Southside  – from TIF to 1/8 mile from TIF * 2006 0.292 0.047 0.074 0.338 6.16 0.000 *** 
Southside  – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2001 
Southside  – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2002 
0.078 0.067 0.006 0.079 1.16 0.244 
0.071 0.069 0.006 0.071 1.03 0.304 
Southside  – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2003 0.105 0.066 0.009 0.108 1.59 0.112 
Southside  – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2004 0.196 0.064 0.021 0.214 3.07 0.002 *** 
Southside  – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2005 0.236 0.061 0.031 0.264 3.84 0.000 *** 
Southside  – from 1/8 to ¼ mile from TIF * 2006 0.236 0.062 0.036 0.265 3.81 0.000 *** 
Southside  – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2001 
Southside  – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2002 
0.221 0.072 0.016 0.245 3.07 0.002 **  *
** 0.162 0.073 0.012 0.174 2.22 0.026 
Southside  – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2003 0.198 0.069 0.017 0.217 2.89 0.004 *** 
Southside  – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2004 0.224 0.067 0.022 0.249 3.35 0.001 *** 
Southside  – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2005 0.200 0.067 0.025 0.220 3.00 0.003 *** 
Southside  – from ¼ to ½ mile from TIF * 2006 0.278 0.066 0.039 0.318 4.21 0.000 *** 
Southside  – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2001 
Southside  – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2002 
-0.044 0.059 -0.003 -0.045 -0.75 0.453 
0.043 0.058 0.003 0.042 0.74 0.459 
Southside  – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2003 0.093 0.060 0.007 0.095 1.56 0.119 
Southside  – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2004 0.030 0.059 0.003 0.029 0.51 0.609 
Southside  – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2005 0.065 0.054 0.007 0.065 1.19 0.232 
Southside  – from ½ to 1 mile from TIF * 2006 0.127 0.053 0.016 0.133 2.38 0.017 ** 
Southside  – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2001 
Southside  – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2002 
0.114 0.083 0.006 0.117 1.38 0.167 
0.005 0.065 0.000 0.001 0.07 0.943 
Southside  – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2003 0.088 0.067 0.005 0.088 1.31 0.189 
Southside  – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2004 0.108 0.063 0.009 0.111 1.72 0.085 * 
Southside  – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2005 0.051 0.059 0.005 0.050 0.86 0.388 
Southside  – from 1 to 1.5 miles from TIF * 2006 0.093 0.062 0.009 0.095 1.50 0.133 
Southside  – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2001 -0.055 0.054 -0.003 -0.056 -1.01 0.310 
Southside  – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2002 -0.055 0.049 -0.003 -0.056 -1.11 0.265 
Southside  – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2003 -0.042 0.066 -0.003 -0.044 -0.64 0.525 
Southside  – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2004 -0.005 0.046 0.000 -0.008 -0.11 0.909 
Southside  – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2005 -0.038 0.043 -0.003 -0.039 -0.87 0.387 
Southside  – from 1.5 to 2 miles from TIF * 2006 0.005 0.048 0.000 0.003 0.11 0.916 
 
 
 
R-square  0.777 
N = 25,599      
 
***   significant at less than 0.01 
**    significant at less than 0.05                               
*      significant at less than 0.10  
 
 
a. Includes only most recent sale per parcel in the 2000-2006 period; also excludes sales under $5,000, those involving relatives, multiple parcels, etc. Full 
description of excluded sales in main text. 
bThis estimate is equal to exp(b-1/2*seb2)-1. See Kennedy (1981) for more information. 
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Figure 1. The City of Atlanta and the Beltline Tax Increment Financing District 
Median Family Income, 1999 and Housing Unit Density, 2000 by Census Tract 
 
Figure 2. The Beltline TIF, with Buffers, Fulton County Only 
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Figure 3. Average Annual Increase in Single Family Home Prices, 2000-2006, by Neighborhood 
Planning Unit, City of Atlanta, Fulton County Sales 
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Figure 4. Coverage of the Beltline Proposal/Project in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
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Figure 5. Property Value Trajectories for Beltline TIF Buffer Areas: 
Northside Buffers Compared to More than Two Miles from TIF District 
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Figure 6. Property Value Trajectories for Beltline TIF Buffer Areas: 
Southside Buffers Compared to More than Two Miles from TIF District 
 
 
 
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
A
pp
re
ci
at
io
n 
(v
s.
 2
00
0)
 d
ue
 to
 B
uf
fe
r L
oc
at
io
n
In TIF Within 1/8 mile 1/8 to 1/4 mile 1/4 to 1/2 mile
1/2 to 1 mile 1 to 1.5 miles 1.5 to 2 miles More than 2 miles
Southside TIF Buffer Segments Compared to >2 Miles from TIF
 39
Figure 7.  Southside Price Premiums for Being Located near the Beltline TIF Compared to Being 
More than 2 Miles from TIF, by Year, 2000-2006 
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1 In Georgia, tax increment financing districts are called “tax allocation districts.” 
2 Because Fulton County property records were used to conduct this analysis, the very 
small portion of the city lying in DeKalb County is not included in the price analysis. 
3Excluded sales include those involving: relatives, divorce, or related companies; legal 
difficulties or foreclosure; a bank as seller/buyer; land contracts or a quit claim deed or that did 
not include clear title; a person with adjoining property; property that was burned or razed after 
the sale; a deed of gift; persons having adjoining property; burned or razed property after sale; 
trades of property; portfolio sales; partial interests; life estates; or multiple parcels that were sold 
together for an overall price (so that a per-unit price was unavailable). 
4 The OLS results without the robust estimator were very similar, with the standard errors 
affecting significance for only a few variables. Moreover, the effect on significance was 
generally quite modest.  
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